See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.
[March 12, 1788]
To the People of New York.
Among all the parts of the Constitution, the method of selecting the President is one of the few that has mostly escaped harsh criticism. In fact, it has even earned a rare nod of approval from some of its opponents. One of the more thoughtful critics has conceded in print that the process is pretty well guarded.* I’ll go further: while it may not be perfect, I firmly believe it is excellent. It combines, to a remarkable degree, all the advantages one could hope for in such a process.
It was important that the people’s voice play a role in choosing the person entrusted with such a significant responsibility. This is achieved by giving the power of selection not to a permanent body, but to individuals chosen by the people specifically for this purpose, and at the appropriate moment.
It was equally important that the actual choice be made by individuals best equipped to evaluate the qualities suited for the office, and that they be able to deliberate carefully, weighing all the relevant reasons and considerations. A small group of people, selected by their fellow citizens from the general population, is more likely to have the information and discernment needed to carry out such a complex and demanding evaluation.
It was also particularly important to minimize opportunities for chaos and disorder. Such dangers are especially worrisome in the selection of a President, who would play a major role in governing the country. Fortunately, the system devised offers strong safeguards against this risk. Choosing several people to serve as an intermediate body of electors is far less likely to inflame public emotion or provoke unrest than holding a direct vote for a single individual who would become the sole focus of national attention and desire. And because these electors will meet and vote within their own states, rather than gathering in a single national location, they are less likely to fall prey to public passions—or to pass those passions back to the people.
Perhaps most critically, every practical barrier was needed to block corruption, intrigue, and backroom scheming—the deadliest enemies of republican government. These threats could arise from several sources, but the most dangerous would be foreign powers trying to install a puppet in the presidency. What better way to gain influence than by elevating someone to the presidency who serves their interests?
But the Convention anticipated these dangers and guarded against them with remarkable foresight and care. They did not leave the decision to any standing group of men who could be bribed or manipulated in advance. Instead, they entrusted the task, first, to the people themselves, who select a temporary group of electors for the sole purpose of choosing the President. And the Convention excluded from this responsibility anyone whose position might suggest excessive loyalty to the sitting President. No senator, representative, or other federal officeholder may serve as an elector. In this way, without compromising the broader public, those tasked with the immediate choice will begin their work free from undue influence or hidden loyalties. Because the electors serve only temporarily and operate independently in their home states, there’s good reason to believe they will remain free from undue influence through the end of the process. Corruption on such a scale would require not just intent, but time and coordination—both of which are in short supply when the individuals involved are scattered across thirteen states and exist only for a single task. Nor would it be easy to draw them into schemes based on motives that, while not strictly corrupt, might still lead them away from their duty.
Another crucial goal was to ensure the President would be independent of everyone except the people. If his continued tenure depended on the favor of others, he might be tempted to serve them rather than the public interest. The Constitution addresses this by making his reelection depend on a new, specially appointed body of electors—representatives chosen only to make that decision.
All of these advantages come together in the plan adopted by the Convention. The people in each state choose electors, equal in number to that state’s senators and representatives, who meet in their own state and vote for someone they believe fit to be President. Their votes are then transmitted to the national capital. If one candidate receives a majority of the total votes, that person becomes President. But because it may not always happen that a majority unites behind a single candidate—and because allowing someone to win with merely a plurality could be dangerous—the Constitution wisely provides a safeguard. In such a case, the House of Representatives selects the President from among the five candidates who received the most electoral votes, choosing the one they believe best qualified for the office.
This method of electing the President offers a strong degree of moral certainty that the office will rarely fall to someone lacking the necessary qualifications. In a single state, talents for petty scheming or superficial popularity may be enough to win high office. But to gain the trust and confidence of the entire Union—or even of a substantial part of it—a candidate must possess different qualities and a higher kind of merit. It is no exaggeration to say that there will be a consistent likelihood of the presidency being held by individuals distinguished for their ability and virtue. And this will be seen as a meaningful strength of the Constitution—at least by those capable of judging how necessarily the executive shapes the success or failure of any government. Though we cannot accept the political heresy of the poet who claimed,
For forms of government let fools contest—
That which is best administered is best,
we can safely say that the real test of any government is its ability to produce good administration.
The Vice President is to be chosen in the same way as the President, with one key difference: if no candidate receives a majority, the Senate decides the outcome for the Vice President, just as the House of Representatives does for the President.
Some have objected to creating a separate office for the Vice President, calling it unnecessary—or even harmful. They argue it would be better to let the Senate choose one of its own members to serve in that role. But two reasons support the Convention’s decision.
First, to ensure that the Senate can always reach a final decision when votes are tied, the presiding officer must only cast a tie-breaking vote. If a senator were pulled from his seat to serve as President of the Senate, that would mean his state gives up a regular vote in exchange for a vote that might only be used occasionally.
Second, because the Vice President may sometimes have to step in as President, all the reasons that support the President’s mode of election apply with great—if not equal—force to the selection of the Vice President.
And it’s worth noting that this objection, like many others, would also apply to our own state constitution. In New York, we elect a Lieutenant Governor by popular vote. That person presides over the state Senate and serves as acting Governor when needed—just as the Vice President would assume the powers and responsibilities of the presidency under similar circumstances.
— Publius
* See Federal Farmer No. 3.
See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.
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