Federalist No. 10 — Controlling the Violence of Faction (modernized)

See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.

[November 22, 1787]

To the People of New York.

The Power of a Well-Constructed Union

One of the greatest advantages of a well-constructed union is its capacity to break and control the violence of faction.¹ Anyone who values popular government feels most alarmed for its future when confronted with its tendency toward faction. He will recognize the true worth of any plan that can solve this problem without sacrificing the core principles of liberty and self-governance. Instability, injustice, and disorder in government institutions have been the mortal diseases that have doomed popular governments throughout history. Opponents of liberty eagerly seize on these failures as proof that self-government is doomed to fail.

Though the American state constitutions have improved upon earlier republican models, they have not solved the problem of faction. Thoughtful and virtuous citizens—committed to both public and private liberty—often voice serious concerns: our governments are too unstable; the public good is ignored in the battles between rival parties; and decisions are too often driven by the will of an overbearing majority rather than by justice and the rights of the minority.

We may wish these complaints were unfounded, but the facts prove otherwise. On honest reflection, we’ll see that some of our troubles have been wrongly blamed on the government. But at the same time, other causes can’t fully explain many of our worst problems—especially the growing distrust of government commitments and the widespread fear for private rights, echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These problems are, for the most part, the direct result of the instability and injustice that factionalism has brought into our public administration.

What Factions Are and How to Address Them

A faction is a group of citizens, whether a majority or a minority, united by some shared passion or interest that is contrary to the rights of others or to the long-term good of society.

There are two ways to deal with the dangers of faction:

Remove their causes.
Control their effects.

To remove the causes of faction, there are only two options:

Destroy liberty itself, which is essential to their existence.
Give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests.

The first remedy is worse than the disease. Liberty fuels faction just as air fuels fire. You wouldn’t wish to eliminate air because it feeds fire any more than you should eliminate liberty to prevent faction. Both are essential—air to life, and liberty to political freedom.

The second option is just as impractical as the first is unwise. As long as humans are free to think for themselves, they will have different opinions. As long as self-interest exists, opinions and passions will influence each other. The diversity of faculties¹—especially in acquiring property—makes it impossible for everyone to share the same interests. In fact, protecting these diverse abilities is the primary purpose of government. But this protection inevitably leads to inequality, which divides society into different classes and interests.

The Causes and Consequences of Faction

Factions are a natural result of human nature. People will always form groups based on shared opinions—whether about religion, politics, or leadership. Leaders vying for power and individuals whose personal stories inspire human passions have long divided people into hostile camps. Often, the most trivial distinctions are enough to spark bitter conflict.

But the most persistent and dangerous source of faction has always been the unequal distribution of property. Those who own property and those who do not will always have opposing interests. Creditors and debtors fall into similar conflict. Landowners, manufacturers, merchants, and moneyed interests naturally form distinct groups with different views and goals. Balancing these competing interests is the primary task of modern legislation, ensuring that party spirit will always be part of governance.

When Legislators Become Judges

No one should be a judge in their own case because personal interest will inevitably bias their judgment. Yet, in many key acts of legislation, legislators are both judges and parties to the issue at hand. For example, when passing laws about private debts, creditors and debtors are naturally on opposite sides of the issue. Justice should hold the balance, but the most powerful group—or the largest faction—will often prevail.

The same is true for taxes and tariffs. The landed class and the manufacturing class may have opposing views on how much to restrict foreign goods, and their decisions will often favor their own interests. Even apportioning taxes—something that demands impartiality—offers endless temptation for a majority to shift the burden onto others. Every dollar they shift onto the minority is one less taken from their own pockets.

We cannot simply rely on enlightened statesmen to balance these competing interests. They will not always be in power. And even when they are, the broader considerations needed to maintain fairness will rarely prevail over immediate, self-serving motives.

Controlling the Effects of Faction

Since we cannot eliminate the causes of faction without destroying liberty, we must focus on controlling its effects.

If a faction is a minority, the republican principle allows the majority to defeat its harmful aims through regular voting. The faction may create obstacles for governance, but it won’t be able to carry out its plans or hide its actions under the guise of law.

When a majority forms a faction, however, the problem becomes far more serious. Popular government makes it possible for a majority to pursue its passions or interests at the expense of the public good and the rights of others. The challenge, then, is to protect public good and private rights from majority faction while preserving both the form and spirit of popular government.

There are only two ways to achieve this:

Prevent the same passion or interest from taking hold in a majority at the same time.
Ensure that even if a majority shares the same passion or interest, they are too dispersed to act in concert.

Experience shows we cannot rely on moral or religious motives to prevent injustice and violence—especially in large groups. These motives lose their power precisely when they are needed most.

Why a Republic is Superior to a Democracy

A pure democracy—where a small group of citizens governs directly—offers no solution to the problem of faction. A majority will almost always share a common passion or interest, and the nature of such a government makes it easy for them to coordinate and oppress the minority. That is why democracies have historically been plagued by turbulence and conflict, leaving them short-lived and unstable.

A republic—where government is based on representation—offers a promising solution. Two key differences set a republic apart from a democracy:

The government is delegated to a small group of elected representatives.
A republic can govern a larger population and territory.

The Advantage of a Large Republic

Representation allows public views to be refined and expanded through the wisdom of elected officials, making it more likely that decisions will reflect the public good rather than fleeting passions. Of course, there is always a risk that unworthy candidates will gain power through corruption or manipulation. But this danger is minimized in a large republic for two reasons:

More Qualified Candidates: A larger republic offers a greater pool of talent, increasing the odds of selecting capable leaders.
More Voters per Representative: In larger districts, it’s harder for unworthy candidates to manipulate the process. The votes are more likely to go to individuals with true merit and broad support.

Finally, the larger the republic, the harder it is for any single faction to dominate. Expanding the sphere of government increases the variety of interests and parties, making it less likely that a majority will share a common motive to infringe on others’ rights. Even if such a motive exists, it will be far harder for them to act in unison.

The Unique Strength of the Union

The same advantage that a republic has over a democracy in controlling faction exists between a large and small republic—and between the proposed union and the individual states. Does this advantage come from having representatives whose broader views and stronger commitment to justice protect them from local biases and unjust schemes? If so, the union’s representatives will be best equipped to meet that standard.

Does the advantage lie in the greater variety of interests, which makes it less likely for a majority to oppress the minority? If so, the union’s broader diversity of parties and interests offers even greater security.

Does it consist of the obstacles that prevent factions from coordinating and carrying out unjust plans? Again, the size and scope of the union offer the most obvious advantage.

Factious leaders may stir up unrest within individual states, but they are unlikely to spread their influence across the entire union. A religious sect may dominate politics in one state, but the sheer variety of sects across the union prevents any one group from taking over nationally. Similarly, dangerous policies like issuing worthless paper money,² canceling debts, or redistributing property may corrupt a single county or district, but they’ll have a much harder time spreading across an entire state, let alone the union.

In both its size and structure, the proposed union offers a republican remedy for the common diseases of republican government. If we take pride in being republicans, we must be equally committed to upholding the principles of federalism and protecting its institutions.

— Publius

¹ The “diversity of faculties” refers to the natural differences in ability and opportunity that lead to differences in property ownership and social class.
² Worthless paper money refers to the unbacked currency issued by some states during the post-Revolution period, leading to severe economic instability.