See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.
[February 6, 1788]
To the People of New York.
How do we ensure that power remains properly divided among the branches of government, as laid out in the Constitution? The solution lies in designing the government’s internal structure so that each part naturally checks the others. External safeguards are not enough. Instead, each branch must have the means and incentives to protect its own authority from encroachment by the others. I won’t attempt to explain every detail of this principle, but I’ll offer some general thoughts that may clarify how the government created by the Constitutional Convention achieves this goal.
To preserve liberty, each branch of government must have a will of its own. This means its members should have as little influence as possible over the selection of members in the other branches. Ideally, the people would choose the members of each branch independently, through separate channels. While this may seem difficult in theory, it is more practical than it appears. Still, there are instances where strict adherence to this rule would be either impractical or unwise.
The judiciary, in particular, requires exceptions. Judges need specific qualifications, so the focus must be on selecting the most capable candidates. Additionally, because judges hold their positions for life, they soon become independent of the authorities that appointed them.
It is equally important that no branch controls the financial support of the others. If judges or the executive relied on the legislature for their salaries, their independence would be little more than an illusion.
The best safeguard against any one branch consolidating power is to give each one both the constitutional tools and personal incentives to resist encroachments by the others. In this, as in any system, the defenses must match the potential threats. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.¹ The personal interests of those in office must align with their constitutional duties. It may seem cynical to design a system based on conflicting ambitions, but what is government but a reflection on human nature?² If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels governed men, we wouldn’t need checks and balances. But since governments are run by people, the challenge is twofold: we must first give the government enough power to control the people, and then compel it to control itself.
A government’s primary check is its dependence on the people, but experience has taught us the necessity of additional safeguards.
This principle—balancing power through opposing interests—can be seen throughout human affairs. We often divide authority in organizations and offices to ensure that personal interests serve as a guard over public rights. These precautions are just as necessary when distributing the supreme powers of the state.
Of course, it’s impossible to give every branch an equal ability to defend itself. In a republican government, the legislative branch naturally dominates. The solution is to divide the legislature into two chambers, with different methods of election³ and distinct responsibilities, to reduce the risk of collusion. At the same time, we must strengthen the executive to prevent it from being overpowered by the legislature.
An absolute veto might seem like the executive’s natural defense, but it could prove dangerous. In normal circumstances, it might not be used firmly enough; in extreme situations, it could be abused. A better approach is to give the weaker department (the executive) a connection to the weaker branch of the legislature,⁴ allowing them to support each other’s constitutional roles without compromising their independence.
If these principles are correct—and I believe they are—we can use them to assess both the state and federal constitutions. While the federal Constitution may not follow them perfectly, it adheres far more closely to these principles than the state constitutions do.
There are two features of America’s federal system that deserve special attention.
First, in a single republic, all the power given up by the people is handed over to a single government, where it is divided into separate branches to prevent abuse. But in America’s compound republic,⁵ power is first divided between the federal and state governments, then subdivided among the branches of each. This creates double security for the people’s rights: the two levels of government check each other while also checking themselves.
Second, it is important to protect society not just from its rulers but from itself. Different groups and classes of citizens will always have different interests. When a majority unites around a common interest, the rights of the minority are at risk. There are two ways to guard against this danger:
- Create a power independent of the majority.
- Foster so many competing interests that no unjust majority can easily form.
The first method—common in monarchies and aristocracies—is unreliable. An independent power might just as easily support an unjust majority as protect minority rights. The second method, used in America’s federal system, divides society into so many different groups and interests that it becomes nearly impossible for an unjust majority to dominate.
In a free government, civil rights must be protected the same way religious rights are: through diversity. Just as the existence of many religious sects prevents any one from dominating, a variety of competing interests protects individual rights. The more diverse the interests, the more secure our liberties become.
This view should appeal to anyone who supports republican government. The more you divide the Union into smaller confederacies or states, the easier it becomes for oppressive majorities to form. In contrast, a large, diverse republic provides the best protection for the rights of every class of citizens.
Justice is the goal of government. It is the goal of civil society. It has always been pursued—sometimes achieved, sometimes lost in the process. In a society where a powerful majority can easily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy reigns just as it does in the state of nature, where the strong dominate the weak. Just as individuals eventually seek government to protect themselves, powerful factions will come to value a government that protects everyone.
Take Rhode Island as an example. If it were separated from the Union and left on its own, the insecurity of rights under its narrow, popular government would quickly become apparent. Repeated oppression by ruling factions would eventually force even the oppressors to recognize the need for a stronger, independent authority to restore order. The very factions responsible for the misrule would become voices calling for its remedy.
By contrast, in the extended republic of the United States, where a great diversity of interests, parties, and sects exists, it is far harder for unjust majorities to form. A coalition of the majority can rarely unite around anything other than principles of justice and the general good. With fewer opportunities for factional tyranny, there is less need to introduce a separate will independent of the people—no need for a power outside society itself to protect against society’s excesses.
In fact, it is both certain and crucial that the larger the society, provided it remains within a manageable size, the more capable it becomes of governing itself. Happily for the republican cause,⁶ our federal system allows the sphere of self-governance to extend far beyond what was once thought possible, thanks to a careful blend of the federal principle.⁷
— Publius
¹ Ambition must be made to counteract ambition: This famous phrase highlights how the Constitution relies on human self-interest to maintain a balance of power.
² What is government but a reflection on human nature?: A core idea in political philosophy—governments exist because humans are flawed and need both control and restraint.
³ Different Methods of Election: Originally, members of the House of Representatives were elected directly by the people, while Senators were chosen by state legislatures. This method reinforced federalism by ensuring that states retained direct influence over the federal government. The 17th Amendment, ratified in 1913, shifted the election of Senators to a popular vote, aligning their selection with the House’s electoral process and reducing state legislatures’ direct role in federal governance.
⁴ Weaker branch of the legislature: Refers to the Senate, which was considered weaker than the House of Representatives because Senators were appointed, not popularly elected. The Senate and the President had overlapping roles, such as confirming appointments, which allowed them to support each other’s authority while remaining distinct.
⁵ Compound republic: Refers to the federal system in the United States, where power is divided between national and state governments.
⁶ Republican cause: Refers to the commitment to republican principles—representative government, the rule of law, and checks on power.
⁷ Federal principle: The U.S. system’s division of authority between federal and state governments, combining national unity with local autonomy.
teddy ray 