See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.
[November 20, 1787]
To the People of New York.
The Consequences of Disunion
If we accept as an established truth that, in the event of disunion, the individual states—or whatever new alliances might emerge from the ruins of the Confederacy—would experience the same cycles of war and peace, friendship and hostility, as all neighboring nations not united under one government, we must examine the consequences of such a situation.
In the early years of their independence, war between the states would be far more destructive than it typically is in countries with longstanding military institutions. The professional armies maintained in Europe, though often seen as threats to liberty and financial prudence, have at least prevented sudden conquests and the rapid devastation that once characterized warfare. Fortifications have served the same purpose. Across Europe, chains of fortified cities hinder invasions. Entire campaigns are consumed by efforts to capture just a few frontier strongholds. Every step forward depletes an invader’s resources and slows their advance. In earlier times, an army could reach the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as its approach was known; now, even a relatively small but disciplined defensive force can resist and ultimately defeat a much larger invading army. Warfare in Europe has become a series of battles that rarely decide anything—towns taken and retaken, retreats that prove more advantageous than victories, and enormous effort yielding minimal gains.
America would face the opposite scenario. Distrust of standing armies would delay their establishment as long as possible. The lack of fortifications would leave state borders open to attack. More populous states would easily overrun their smaller neighbors. Conquests would be easily won but hard to hold. War would become chaotic and predatory, with plunder and destruction following in the wake of irregular militias. The suffering of individuals, rather than the clash of organized forces, would define our military conflicts.
This is no exaggeration, though I acknowledge that such a state of affairs would not last indefinitely. The need for security is the most powerful force shaping national policies. Even the most passionate commitment to liberty eventually yields to the demands of self-preservation. The widespread destruction of life and property caused by war, the constant effort required to remain on guard, and the perpetual fear of attack would drive even the most freedom-loving people to accept institutions that gradually erode their civil and political rights. To be safer, they would eventually accept being less free.
The Rise of Standing Armies
These institutions, of course, are standing armies and their associated military structures. Critics argue that the proposed Constitution does not prohibit standing armies, and therefore, they may exist under it.* Their existence, however, is uncertain at best. Yet it is undeniable that disunion would lead inevitably to standing armies. Frequent wars and constant threats, which demand continuous preparation, would make them unavoidable. The weaker states or confederacies would be the first to establish standing armies, seeking to match the power of stronger neighbors. To compensate for their smaller populations and resources, they would adopt more disciplined forces, build fortifications, and strengthen executive authority. In doing so, their governments would gradually drift toward monarchy. War inherently expands executive power at the expense of legislative authority.
The states or confederacies that adopted these measures would soon gain an advantage over their neighbors. History shows that smaller states with strong governments and disciplined armies have often triumphed over larger but less organized rivals. Neither the pride nor the security of the more powerful states would allow them to tolerate this disadvantage for long. They would adopt similar measures to restore their dominance. Before long, every region of the country would establish the same instruments of despotism that have plagued Europe. This outcome is the natural course of events, and our reasoning is most reliable when it aligns with historical patterns.
These conclusions are not speculative concerns about supposed defects in a constitution that places power in the hands of the people and their representatives. Rather, they are inevitable results of the way human affairs progress.
Some may object: Why didn’t standing armies arise from the conflicts that so often disrupted the ancient Greek republics? There are multiple satisfactory answers. The economic and social conditions of modern nations differ greatly from those of ancient Greece. Today, people are preoccupied with commerce and agriculture, making a citizenry of full-time soldiers impractical. The increase in wealth, the development of financial systems, and the expansion of industry have transformed warfare, making professional armies an essential part of any nation engaged in frequent conflicts.
Additionally, there is a significant difference between military establishments in a country rarely threatened by invasion and one constantly at risk. In the former, governments have no excuse to maintain large armies, even if they wished to. Since these armies are rarely needed for domestic defense, the people are not conditioned to accept military subordination. Civil institutions remain strong, untouched by military influence. A small army poses no real threat to public liberty, and citizens, not relying on the military for protection, neither fear nor revere it. They tolerate it as a necessary evil but stand ready to resist any abuses of power. Under these circumstances, an army may assist in suppressing small uprisings, but it cannot enforce widespread tyranny against the will of the people.
In a country facing constant threats, the opposite occurs. The persistent danger forces the government to maintain large standing armies. The continual reliance on the military increases its influence while diminishing the status of ordinary citizens. The military state rises above the civil one. People who live in war-torn regions suffer repeated violations of their rights, gradually weakening their resistance to government overreach. Over time, they begin to see soldiers not just as protectors but as superiors. From there, it is only a short step to accepting them as masters. Once a people reach this state of mind, it becomes nearly impossible to inspire them to resist military-backed usurpations of their rights.
Lessons from Britain
Great Britain provides an example of the first scenario. As an island nation with a powerful navy, it has little need for a large standing army. A modest force sufficient to repel a sudden invasion has been deemed adequate. No national policy has justified, nor would public opinion tolerate, a large domestic army. As a result, Britain has avoided many of the internal dangers associated with militarization. This geographical advantage has played a significant role in preserving British liberty, even in the face of corruption and political decay. Had Britain been located on the European continent, it would have had to match the military establishments of other great powers, and it is likely that, like them, it would have long ago succumbed to absolute rule. It is possible, though not easy, that Britain could lose its freedom for other reasons—but it will not be through the unchecked power of a standing army too small to dominate the nation.
The Importance of Preserving the Union
If we preserve our Union, we too can enjoy similar advantages for generations. Europe is far away, and its nearby colonies are unlikely to pose a serious threat. In this position, we do not need extensive military establishments for security. But if we dissolve the Union, breaking into separate states or confederacies, we will soon find ourselves in the same situation as the continental powers of Europe. Our liberties will be at the mercy of the military forces we build to defend ourselves from one another’s ambitions and suspicions.
This is not a trivial or speculative concern. It is a serious, weighty issue that every prudent and honest citizen, regardless of political persuasion, should consider carefully. If they reflect on it soberly, examining its implications and consequences, they will not allow minor objections to stand in the way of adopting a Constitution whose rejection would likely mean the end of the Union. The imaginary fears that preoccupy some critics would soon vanish in the face of real, undeniable, and formidable dangers.
— Publius
* This objection will be fully examined in a later discussion, where it will be shown that the only reasonable safeguard on this issue has already been included—and that it is far better than any protection found in previous American constitutions, most of which offered no safeguard at all.
See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.
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