See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.
[November 21, 1787]
To the People of New York.
A strong and unified nation is essential for peace and liberty, protecting against internal divisions and uprisings. Reading the histories of the small republics of Greece and Italy evokes horror and disgust at their constant turmoil. These states were trapped in a cycle of unrest and rapid revolutions, swinging endlessly between tyranny and anarchy. Even brief moments of calm served only as pauses before the next storm. Occasional glimpses of happiness bring regret, knowing they were soon drowned by waves of factional conflict. And while moments of brilliance sometimes emerged, they were too often distorted by corrupt leadership, tarnishing the great talents for which these lands were once known.
Lessons from History: Misuse of Republican Failures
The chaotic experiences of those republics gave fuel to the advocates of despotism. They argued that republican government itself—and even civil liberty—was inherently unstable. These opponents of liberty delighted in pointing to the failures of free government as proof of their theories. Yet history has also refuted their claims. A few remarkable republics, built on liberty and enduring for generations, have demonstrated that free government can succeed. I trust America will build a magnificent and lasting example of this truth—a lasting refutation of their mistaken beliefs.
The Evolution of Political Science
Critics of republican government were not entirely wrong—their descriptions of past republics were accurate reflections of the instability that plagued those systems. If it had been impossible to design better models, supporters of liberty would have had to concede that republican government was indefensible. But, like other sciences, political science has advanced significantly. We now understand several key principles that were either unknown or only partially grasped by the ancients.
Among these innovations are:
- The separation of power into distinct branches.
- Checks and balances in the legislative process.
- Independent courts with judges serving for life, conditioned on good behavior.
- Representative government through elected officials.
These developments help preserve the strengths of republican government while minimizing its flaws. To these improvements, I will add one more—an idea that has been criticized by some opponents of the new Constitution: the enlargement of the republic’s size. Expanding the scope of a republic, whether by enlarging a single state or combining multiple smaller states into a confederation, is a powerful tool for promoting stability. Since the latter is most relevant here, we will focus on how expanding the size of the union can strengthen republican government. The application of this principle to individual states will be addressed elsewhere.
The Utility of a Confederation
The idea of a confederation as a way to suppress faction, maintain internal peace, and strengthen external security is not new. It has been practiced in various countries and eras, and many of the most respected political writers have endorsed it. Opponents of the proposed Constitution have eagerly cited Montesquieu’s argument that a republic must be confined to a small territory. But they seem unaware of his statements elsewhere in the same work, or they have failed to consider the full implications of the principle they so readily embrace.
When Montesquieu recommended that republics should remain small, the examples he had in mind were far smaller than nearly all of our states. Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, and Georgia are all much larger than the models he used as a basis for his argument. If we take his ideas literally, we would be left with only two options: either embrace monarchy or divide ourselves into countless tiny, jealous, and clashing republics—endless sources of conflict and the pitiful objects of universal scorn.
Some writers on the opposing side have recognized this dilemma and even gone so far as to suggest that the larger states should be broken up. Such a reckless policy might create more petty offices, benefiting men with little ambition beyond their personal intrigues. But it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the American people.
As mentioned earlier, the detailed examination of this principle will be addressed elsewhere. For now, it’s enough to point out that, according to the very author most frequently cited on this issue, his recommendation would only call for reducing the size of the larger states. It would not argue against all of them being part of a single confederate government. And that is the real question we are concerned with here.
Montesquieu’s Real Argument
Far from opposing a general union of the states, Montesquieu explicitly endorses a confederate republic as the best way to expand the scope of popular government while combining the strengths of monarchy and republicanism:
“It is very probable that mankind would have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republic, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a confederate republic. This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing through new associations until it can provide for the security of the united body.
“A republic of this kind, able to withstand external force, may support itself without internal corruption. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences. If a single member should attempt to usurp supreme authority, he could not possibly command equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to gain too much influence over one state, it would alarm the others. Were he to subdue part of the confederation, the remaining free states could overpower him before he consolidated his usurpation.
“Should a popular insurrection arise in one state, the others could suppress it. If abuses creep into one part, they can be corrected by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side without affecting the other parts; the confederation may dissolve, but the individual states would retain their sovereignty.
“As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each and the external strength of a large monarchy.”
I have quoted this passage at length because it brilliantly summarizes the principal arguments in favor of the Union. It should dispel any false impressions caused by a selective reading of Montesquieu’s work. Moreover, it directly supports our current purpose: illustrating how the Union helps suppress domestic faction and insurrection.
Confederation vs. Consolidation
Some have drawn a subtle but flawed distinction between a confederation and a consolidation of states. They claim that in a true confederation, the federal government should only act on the member states collectively and not on individuals. They also argue that equal voting power among the states is essential. These positions are arbitrary and lack support from principle or precedent. While many confederate governments have operated in this way, there are numerous exceptions that prove there is no absolute rule. As we will demonstrate, wherever this principle has prevailed, it has caused chronic disorder and weakness in government.
The definition of a confederate republic is simply an association of two or more states into one state. The extent and nature of federal authority are matters of discretion. As long as the states maintain their separate organizations for local purposes—even if they are subordinate to the federal government—the system remains a confederacy. The proposed Constitution does not abolish state governments; it makes them essential parts of the national government by giving them representation in the Senate and preserving important areas of sovereign power. This arrangement fully aligns with any reasonable definition of a federal government.
Historical Example: The Lycian Confederacy
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of 23 cities or republics, voting power in the common council was distributed based on the size of the city. Large cities had three votes, medium-sized ones had two, and the smallest had one. The common council appointed all judges and magistrates—a significant intrusion into local administration, as the appointment of officers is typically a local prerogative. Yet Montesquieu praised the Lycian confederacy, declaring, “Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia.”
Clearly, the distinctions insisted upon by some critics were not part of Montesquieu’s thinking. They are modern inventions rooted in a flawed theory.
— Publius
See all modernizations at my Federalist Project page.
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